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  Abstract 
This paper analyses the duration of firm-bank relationships and examines what drives firms in 
China to change from one bank loan provider to another. Matched data of firm-loan-duration 
to bank provides a unique panel data set of relationship between China’s listed firms and their 
lending banks consisting of 2,102 firms listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the period of 1996-2016. The Cox proportional hazard model is 
used to allow for a semiparametric hazard function after parametrically controlling for firm-
specific financial factors, industry factors, ownership characteristics, internal management 
changes, and external macroeconomic changes. In addition, we explore the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis, bank-financial and ownership characteristics. The main finding of this study is 
that in an environment of growing commercialisation of relationships the firm-bank 
relationship between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-owned banks (SOBs) in China 
remains super-stable. However, a change in the CEO of a firm even of a SOE increases the 
probability of the loan-provider being changed. 
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1. Introduction 
A strong firm-bank relationship is generally accepted as fundamental to smooth access to credit 
at favourable terms (Berger and Udell, 1995; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). The extant theory 
suggests that while there is a positive impact of relationship banking on easing the credit 
constraints for firms, relationship banking can also create the conditions for informational 
capture and lock-in, resulting in unfavourable terms and conditions in loan contracts (e.g., Boot, 
2000).  
The rapid development of the Chinese economy has been matched by the expansion of 
the loan market. While the formal financial sector in China has seen a fast growth of the capital 
market, it remains dominated by the banking industry. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 54% of the total financing for Chinese firms were provided by banks in 
2016. Historically, the banking industry was dominated by the state-owned banks (SOBs) and 
the economy was almost exclusively made up of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is 
commonly recognised that the SOEs were favoured over non-SOEs in access to bank credit 
because of government’s dual dominance in banking and commerce. Political, administrative, 
and social connections strengthened the traditional concept of ‘guanxi’ in Chinese business 
which cemented the bank-firm relationship between SOEs and SOBs.  
 However, the exclusivity and strength of this relationship, and the lack of opportunity 
for the SOBs to diversify, have partly been the reason for their historically high non-performing 
loan (NPL) ratio. With the evolution of the SOEs, a rise in the private sector, and the reform 
of the banking industry in the 1990s, the NPL ratio of the SOEs declined gradually from 17.9% 
in 2003 to 1.83% in 2018. The growth of the non-SOE sector in the Chinese economy and the 
decline of the SOBs in the banking sector have signalled an increasing degree of 
commercialisation in the firm-bank relationship2. The improvement in the performance of 
Chinese banks also indicate a greater focus on credit quality and repayment ability. The 
changing environment is arguably a challenge to the conventional firm-bank relationship, 
especially to the SOE-SOB relationship.  
The history of the Chinese loan market may be summarised by one economic principle 
– switching behaviour is driven by the benefits and costs of maintaining a stable firm-bank 
relationship. Therefore, we are motivated to investigate if the SOE-SOB relationship - the most 
important firm-bank relationship in China – has evolved towards greater commercialisation. In 
 
2 More details about commercialization can be found in the Appendix A.1 Commercialization.  
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particular, we would like to see if the interpersonal social connections (consistent with 
‘guanxi’) between senior management in the SOEs and SOBs continues to buttress the bank-
firm relationship at a time of increasing commercialisation of relationships. If this type of 
relationship continues undiluted then it suggests that the economic reform to restructure 
institutional incentives is yet to be fully aligned with the market incentives. 
In China, it is well-known that firms cultivate multiple bank relationships and therefore 
switching from one loan provider to another does not necessarily imply a weakening of the 
firm-bank relationship with the previous provider. Similarly, the literature on switching of 
banks by firms does not necessarily imply that the firm cannot return to its previous provider 
at a future date. Rather than terminating a current bank relationship and switch to other banks 
completely, firms in China may change their bank loan providers frequently, while still 
maintaining a relationship with their previous banks through loan activities or other business 
activities. This study interrogates the literature on switching of bank loan provider by firms to 
develop a methodology to examine the determinants of a change in the loan provider within 
multiple firm-bank relationships.  
A number of Chinese studies have examined the role of firm-bank relationships from a 
qualitative perspective, but Yin and Mathews (2016, 2017) have quantitatively modelled the 
probabilistic causes of a firm-bank switch. These studies ask the question, what is the 
probability of a firm switching its main credit provider given initial conditions of the firm, the 
conditions of the bank, and the economic environment?  
This paper identifies the time-varying factors that contribute to a change. In other 
words, it poses the question, what are the determining factors that cause a switch? These factors 
could be changing conditions of the firm, changing conditions of the bank, changing conditions 
of the external environment, or simply a change in the CEO, which requires a repositioning of 
the firm-bank relationship. The answer to this research question provides insights into the 
commercialization of business relationships that follow from the economic reform process in 
China. How have firm, bank, and economic circumstances changed over time to warrant a 
change in firm’s bank loan provider? To answer this research question, we analyse the loan 
duration of the listed Chinese firms and examine what drive the firms to switch from one loan 
provider to another. 
In contrast to previous studies this paper emphasises the time-varying factors that 
contribute to a switch. To achieve this, we employ the semiparametric Cox proportional hazard 
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model, which to the best of our knowledge is a first in the Chinese banking literature. The 
advantage of the semiparametric model, over the parametric probit/logit model, is that it allows 
for a nonparametric hazard function without imposing any functional-form restriction, while 
controlling for changes of those factors when a change happens in a parametric way. More 
importantly, a survival model such as the Cox model is designed to capture the dynamic feature 
of the hazard profile, i.e. the probability of a switch is time dependent. In contrast, the 
probit/logit model presumes either a constant probability of switch (if the duration of 
relationship is not included in the specification) or a linear probability of switch (if included). 
The semiparametric Cox model, however, does not have any parametric restriction on the 
hazard profile, so it is much more flexible and robust.  
To pre-empt our results, we find that Chinese firms are less likely to change loan 
provider when the firm is large, or state-owned, or heavily leveraged. A change is more likely 
if the provider bank is not state-owned. These two findings underscore the continuing strength 
of the SOE-SOB firm-bank relationship in the face of increased competition and 
commercialization of the domestic credit market. This finding may not be a surprise to scholars 
of the Chinese banking market, but we also identify other factors that affect a change in 
provider. Understandably, the likelihood of a change declined during the financial crisis years 
of 2007-9. The likelihood of a change is sector-specific led by the real estate sector. Finally, a 
change in CEO in a SOE that had a lending relationship with a SOB, increased the likelihood 
of a change in loan provider.  
Before moving on to the literature, a word is due here about Chinese banking and the 
concept of guanxi in the context of emerging economies. It should be noted that while guanxi 
is a particularly Chinese phenomenon with roots in Confucianism, the concept, which covers 
personal business relations and reciprocity in business is common to Asian culture (Wong, 2007; 
Lee et al., 2018). Like China, the banking markets of many Asian economies have dominant 
state-owned banking sectors that are relatively concentrated; experienced high NPL ratios, and 
have gone through, or are undergoing reform processes (Klapper et al., 2014). While this 
research examines the Chinese banking market, our findings will strike a resonance in other 
Asian emerging economies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
theoretical foundation and empirical studies that relate to asymmetric information, and an 
overview of the bank-firm relationship in China. Section 3 demonstrates the methodology, the 
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empirical set-up based on survival analysis, and the description of the data. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the estimated results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Private information plays a key role in bank-borrower relationships, and it is argued that banks 
accumulate private information, from closer relationships and repeated interactions with firms. 
Rival banks that do not have this private information may charge higher loan rates if a firm 
switches from its existing provider. There is broad agreement that closer relationships increase 
credit availability and reduce the cost of bank loans3. But it is also argued that a close firm-
bank relationship increases loan cost through information capture or from the presence of 
search costs for new loan providers resulting in rent extraction as the relationship matures4. 
However, the lock-in effect can be diluted through a reduction in loan size or the initiation of 
multiple bank relationships 5 . Maintaining multiple bank relationships provides liquidity 
insurance to firms and enables them to meet liquidity problem (Elsas et al., 2004). Moreover, 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) suggest that firms borrowing from multiple banks may reduce the 
informational rents of the incumbent bank.  
The extant literature focusses on the main factors that prompt a firm to switch lenders. 
Firms with an asymmetric information problem are more likely to enter into new banking 
relationships with different types of banks with the objective of meeting their changing needs 
and improve their information quality (Hadlock and James, 2002). The borrower-lender 
relationship is also under threat from rival lenders that may provide superior product or lower 
cost, therefore a borrower may terminate the relationship with the incumbent bank whenever 
sufficiently better loan conditions are offered by a competing bank (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; 
and Boot and Thakor, 2000). As firms’ borrowing needs increase which cannot be met by their 
incumbent banks, they will switch to other banks. Firms may also switch banks due to a change 
in the existing relationship bank such as mergers, or restructuring (Gopalan, et al., 2011). 
Turning now to the application of duration analysis in modelling switching behaviour, 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) employ a unique data set of Bolivian loans during the period of 
1999 to 2003 to investigate the loan conditions and bank behaviour when firms switch to other 
 
3 For example, Berger and Udell (1995); Boot and Thakor (1994); Cole (1998); Elsas and Krahnen (1998). 
4 See Sharp (1990); Rajan (1992); Boot (2000); Yin et al. (2015). 
5 See Hubert and Schafer (2002); Agostino et al. (2012). 
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lenders. They define the switching firm as one that is granted a new loan from a bank with 
which it did not have a lending relationship in the previous 12 months. Banks are categorised 
into two types, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The former is the incumbent bank that had loan relation 
in the prior year, while the latter refers to the bank that did not lend to the firm in the previous 
year. Figure 1 illustrates the definition of a switcher, inside and outside banks. Firm A is the 
switcher and Bank 3 is the outside bank for firm A, because Bank 3 lent to other firms but not 
firm A in the prior year. Bank 1 and 2 are the switcher’s inside bank as they had a lending 
relationship in the previous 12 months. Their study focuses on the “time for a change” and they 
find that the main purpose of firms switch to new banks is to obtain a lower rate on their loans, 
but they also find that the new bank will charge higher rates once the firm is informationally 
locked in by the new bank.  
Figure 1: Definitions of switchers, inside bank and outside banks 
 
Source: Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) 
 
The duration of bank-firm relationship and the impact of firm-specific characteristics 
on the likelihood of terminating bank relationships or switching from single to multiple 
relationships was also studied by Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002) and 
Bouchellal and Castro (2016).  A basic Weibull model is employed in order to find the duration 
dependence of these relationships, i.e. whether the likelihood of relationship ending is 
increasing or decreasing (or stable) over time.  
Using a panel data set of the banking relationships of Norwegian firms, Ongena and 
Smith (2001) find that the likelihood of a firm terminating a bank relationship increased with 
the length of the relationship, suggesting that the benefits from relationship decays with time. 
Using both the parametric (Weibull and Exponential) and semi-parametric (Cox) duration 
model that include firm-specific variables, they show that small and young, profitable, highly 
                           Bank 1 
 Firm A              Bank 2 
                           Bank 3 
                                                                                               Switching loan                                            
                               
t = -12                  t = 0 
= starting and ending dates of a loan 
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leveraged “growth” firms, and firms that with more than one bank relationship tend to maintain 
shorter relationships. Apart from this, their study documents a positive duration dependence in 
bank relationships, which implies the likelihood of ending a bank relationship increase over 
time.   Moreover, Farinha and Santos (2002) use a parametric duration model to model the 
switch from a single to a multiple bank relationship. Their results provide evidence that firms 
with more growth opportunities, greater leverage, less liquidity, lower profitability and 
delinquent bank loans are more likely to maintain shorter relationships and initial multiple 
relationships. Similarly, Bouchellal and Castro (2016) use a parametric continuous-time 
Weibull duration model to explore the determinants of a relationship closure between 1,185 
firms and a major French bank. For each relationship spell they control for information on the 
firm-level characteristics, bank market power, pricing conditions, specific bank-firm 
relationship variables and the economic environment. Their findings are consistent with those 
of Ongena and Smith (2001) that confirms older firms, and the firms with higher turnover, 
default probability and profits tend to keep longer relationship with the bank. They also find 
that the lower the banking competition, the higher the likelihood of the bank-firm relationship 
terminate.  
Apart from the duration analysis on bank-firm relationship duration and the choice of 
single or multiple banking relationships, some studies attempt to investigate the determinants 
of a firm’s switching behaviour. According to Stephan et al. (2012)’s study, large and highly 
leveraged firms are more likely to switch their main bank in Ukraine. They emphasize that the 
power of the main bank (measured by equity holdings) is the main driver of firm switching 
behaviour. Additionally, they also find firms have lower performance after switching their main 
bank because of higher loan rates charged by the new bank. A study as to why firms switch to 
new banks has been conducted by Gopalan et al. (2011). Their findings suggest that transparent 
firms, and firms that do not have an existing relationship with large banks are more likely to 
form new banking relationships. Moreover, they find that firms obtain larger loan amounts 
when they switch and form a new banking relationship to overcome borrowing constraints. 
They highlight that firms may benefit from their switching behaviour with an improvement in 
sales growth, capital expenditure, leverage, analyst coverage, and public issuance.  
A number of Chinese studies have examined the effect of bank-firm relationship on cost 
and availability of loans and confirm that a strong and close tie between firm and bank reduces 
the screening and monitoring costs of lenders and therefore reduce firms’ loan costs and 
enhance their accessibility to bank credit. Zhou and Li (2005) use data on 83 SME firms in 
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Guangdong province and document that the average duration of bank-firm relationship is 7 
years and 11 years for contracts of upper bound and lower bound interest rate loans, 
respectively. In addition, they find a negative relation between the length of relationship and 
the loan cost and collateral requirement, which implies that longer duration of bank-firm 
relationship will reduce the cost of loans and the collateral requirement but improve the 
availability of loans for these firms6.  
A few studies have focussed on the firm-bank relationship in the case of SMEs. Using 
survey data from the World Bank, He (2010) examines the bank-firm relationship and loan cost 
for 394 firms in 18 cities in China. They use three indicators to measure the relationship 
between banks and firms, which are the length of duration, the scope (or the number of bank 
relation) and depth of the relationship. They show that both the length and depth of the 
relationship influences the loan cost negatively, while the scope of the relationship positively 
affects the loan cost. To put it differently, SMEs that have a longer and stronger relationship 
with a single bank will have lower loan cost. In contrast, Wu (2005) reports a significantly 
positive impact on the cost of borrowing in the local market using a small sample of SMEs in 
Jiangsu province. Firms with a longer lender relationship duration face a higher cost of 
borrowing.  
A recent study by He (2013) shows that SMEs with a single banking relationship face 
lower collateral conditions in the loan contract. Although a long and close relationship with the 
bank enables the SME to access bank credit more easily, these firms are more likely to suffer 
the “hold-up” problem that would lead to higher cost of loan for SMEs. Higher loan costs result 
from private information being captured by the incumbent bank. However, in a city focussed 
study, Yin et al. (2015) discover how relationship lending and bank competition influences the 
loan cost for SMEs. Their results show that firms can benefit from a less close relationship with 
the bank and stronger banking competition, which result in a significantly lower cost of credit 
for SMEs.  
Much of the empirical literature on the firm-bank relationship in China focusses only 
on a specific geographical area or city in China, and especially the borrowing activity of SMEs. 
Although there is a growing literature on firm-bank relationships recently, among others, Yin 
and Mathews (2016, 2018) explicitly model the causes of firm-bank switching behaviour in 
China. The factors identified by these studies include initial conditions of the firm, the 
 
6 Similar findings are reported in Luo et al. (2011) 
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conditions of the bank, and the economic environment. In addition to the existing studies, this 
study differs in its geographic coverage and firm size and industry. The data used covers 80% 
of listed firms during 1996-2016 and is more comprehensive and thus broadens the existing 
banking literature.  
 
3. Method and Data 
3.1 Model framework 
Survival analysis (also known as duration analysis) has been commonly used in studying and 
modelling problems that include the duration of time before a particular occurrence, such as 
financial stability duration (Aka, 2006), unemployment duration (Caliendo et al., 2016) and 
price duration (Zhou and Dixon, 2018). Many studies have also applied survival analysis to 
examining the duration or termination of firm-bank relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001; 
Farinha and Santos, 2002; and Bouchellal and Castro, 2016). Following their methodology, this 
paper employs duration models to study the passage of time before a firm changes its existing 
bank loan provider to another bank. Furthermore, it investigates the factors that alter the 
duration of the firm-bank relationship in China. The change from one bank loan provider to 
another can be described through a hazard function h(t), which determines the rate at which a 
firm-bank relationship termination occurs, conditional on the relationship spell lasts at least 
until date t. The most important advantage of using a hazard function is that it provides a natural 
way to interpret the process that generates duration, and regression models for duration data 
are more easily grasped by observing how covariates affect the hazard rates. The empirical 
model for estimating the hazard of firms change to other lenders using the Cox proportional 
hazard model can be stated as: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥) = ℎ0(𝑡) ∙ exp(β1 ∙ 𝐅 + β2 ∙ 𝐌 + β3 ∙ 𝐁 + β4∙E + interactive)                                  (1) 
where ℎ0(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the data dependence of duration and 
determines the shape of the hazard function with respect to duration of relationship. This study 
uses time-variant and time varying covariates and controls for firm characteristics (F), 
management characteristics (M), bank characteristics (B) as well as the economic environment 
(E), that is expected to be correlated with the hazard of the firm’s behaviour regarding a change 
in its loan provider. In addition to this, the interactive terms are also included to examine the 
cross effects between ownership of firms or banks and internal or external changes. One 
 
 
10 
 
significant property of the Cox model is that the baseline hazard function  ℎ0(𝑡) does not 
influence the estimate of 𝛽, hence it is often referred as a “semiparametric” model. Instead of 
imposing a specific function form for ℎ0(𝑡), it is left unspecified, while covariates are still 
explicitly estimated.  Since it is not estimating the full model, the advantage of using the Cox 
model is that it can avoid the biases problem caused by specifying an inappropriate baseline 
hazard function. Equation (1) can also be transformed into a Logit model that represents the 
hazard ratio: 
 
ℎ(𝑡|x) 
ℎ0(𝑡)
= exp(β1 ∙ 𝐅 + β2 ∙ 𝐌 + β3 ∙ 𝐁 + β4∙E + interactive)                                               (2) 
This study aims to identify the covariates that causes the firm to terminate a lending 
relationship and change to another bank within the pool of banks of the multiple relationship. 
For each relationship spell, this study considers variables that control for factors that affect the 
firm’s choice to switch. This section firstly introduces the duration variables and the definition 
of an ‘event’ based on survival. Next, it describes the covariates used in this study, which can 
be grouped into three sets related to the firm, ownership of banks and crisis.  
3.2 Measurement of a switch 
The occurrence of switching behaviour in China is slightly different from those in the 
Western economies. In a Chinese characteristic economy, switching from one loan provider to 
another does not necessarily imply a weakening or termination of the firm-bank relationship 
with the previous loan provider. Hence, using the term “changing” may better reflect the actual 
meaning of switching under this specific context7. In this section we use the language of the 
‘switching’ literature as applied to firm-bank relationships. The duration variable (Duration) is 
defined as the length (in months) a firm-bank (or loan) relationship lasts. Firms that have repeat 
borrowing from an incumbent bank may have a longer relationship duration, the repeat 
borrowing is defined as a firm re-borrows from an incumbent bank within twelve months, while 
re-borrowing from an existing relationship bank after twelve months or even a longer gap will 
be counted as a new relationship in this study. The event or failure in this study implies a change 
of loan-provider or switch behaviour (Switch) of the firm. Using the definition made by 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), a new loan is defined as a switch when a firm obtains a new 
loan from a bank with which it did not have a lending relationship during the past 12 months, 
 
7 Both the term “change” and “switch” has been used frequently in this paper, while a switch in China is clarified 
slightly differs from the existing literature, which captures the firm-bank relationships in a Chinese characteristic 
condition.  
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while this firm may still maintain relationship with its previous lender. Following them, a 
switch behaviour in this study can be summarized as two types:  
1) Firm A borrows from the incumbent Bank A in DD/MM//YY with n year loan maturity, but 
Firm A borrows from a new bank (say Bank B) during this period or after the current loan 
relationship ends with Bank A, then a switch occurs for Firm A. 
2) Firm A borrows from the incumbent Bank A in DD/MM/YY with n year loan maturity. After 
repaying the loan by the end of maturity date, there was no loan activity in the following 12 
months or even a longer period, but Firm A re-borrows from Bank A after 12 months or a longer 
gap, a switch occurs for Firm A because this could be viewed as a new relationship89. 
Hence, firms “move” to other banks or “add” a new bank relationship during a 
relationship time period or after a period that longer than 12 months is considered as a switch. 
Firms in China may establish new banking relationship either because they want to maintain 
multiple banking relationships or because they want to switch to a new bank entirely by 
terminating its relationships with its incumbent bank. Coding the failure variable (Switch) equal 
to 1 if the firm has never before borrowed from any of the banks of the current deal, as well as 
those re-borrowing from current bank longer than one-year gap, and 0 for repeated borrowing 
from current banks or termination of current bank relationship without observable new bank 
relationship under analyse period. 
3.3 Variable description 
To switch or not to switch, that is the question, but whose question? These could be two 
sides of factors, the first one is the push factor. Firms are forced to switch (or change) their 
bank loan provider when their financial constraint cannot be met by their incumbent bank. 
Similarly, a tighter credit supply and strong lock-in effect of banks can push firms to switch. 
For the pull factors, firms are allured to switch due to a lower switching cost, better loan 
conditions offered by the rival banks, and more easily to access loans from outside banks 
 
8 Our choice of 12 months can be motivated by Cole (1998), Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). In short, the value of 
private information diminishes over time, if a previous firm-bank relationship has been ended a long time ago (say, 
12 months), it takes as much effort to collect both hard and soft-information of firm and re-established the new 
relationship. 
9 While re-borrow from the incumbent bank within 12 months will not be considered as a switch but a repeated 
borrowing in the data, which does not count for Type 2 switching. In general,  Type 2 switching accounts for about 
24% of all switching in the data, as suggested by the anonymous reviewer, we have performed additional 
robustness tests through excluding Type 2 switching and re-defining Type 2 switching, results have been presented 
in Appendix C. Additional Robustness Test. 
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because of greater banking competition10. Apart from this, changing the economic environment 
such as financial crisis, a tight or loose monetary policy may cause the firm-bank relationship 
to change as well. Therefore, it is a three-side story within the firm, bank and environment. 
This study opens the “black box” by controlling for firm’s management factors, a figure 
demonstrates the conceptual framework  has been included in Appendix B.1 Conceptual 
Framework.    
We use the existing literature as a signpost for the four sets of variables relevant to the 
firm’s attributes that may determine its decision to terminate an existing bank relationship and 
switch (or change) to other banks. These variables measure firm’s performance, executive 
information, lending bank’s information and the economic environment. The variables are 
drawn from the literature and reviewed below. Details of variable definition can be found in 
Appendix A.2 Variable Descriptions. The first group of firm’s specific characteristics relate to 
firm’s size, age, growth opportunity, profitability, leverage, liquidity, ability to pledge collateral, 
and opacity of ownership status as well as industrial effect.  
Early studies show that the age of the firm is closely linked to the duration of its 
relationship with a bank but its influence remains ambiguous (i.e. Petersen and Rajan, 1995, 
Sakai et al., 2010). In addition, large firms are assumed to be more transparent and have less 
dependence on bank financing which enables them to initiate a new bank relationship more 
easily. It is also assumed that they have higher bargaining power to negotiate with the bank for 
better loan conditions (Berger et al., 2005). In contrast, Diamond (1984), and Rajan (1992) state 
that small and young firms are more likely to be involved in the information-capture problem, 
and thus, bank financing is important to them. Holding the level of internal financing constant, 
firms with more growth opportunities should have greater external financing needs, and thus 
be more reliant on bank financing. Hence, the growth opportunity is measured by the sales 
growth and is expected to have negative impact on the likelihood of switching. 
We also consider the firm’s performance and risk level proxied by its profitability, 
leverage, and liquidity. The firm’s profitability (Profit) measured by return on asset, indicates 
a firm’s ability to generate resources and to repay its loans, which allow firms with higher 
profitability to improve their pricing condition. Therefore, a positive relationship between 
firm’s profitability and its conditional hazard of switching is expected. Since bank credit is still 
 
10 See Agostino et al. (2012); Hubert and Schafer (2002); Ongena and Smith (2001); Petersen and Rajan (1995); 
Boot and Thakor (2000). 
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the main source for firm financing in China, the leverage level (Leverage) indicates the firm’s 
ability meet its long-term financial obligations. Highly leveraged firms will be more dependent 
on banks than firms with lower debt levels, and thus less likely to change their bank loan 
provider. Cash flows (Cash flows) is an indicator that identifies the liquidity risk of the firm 
which could affect their repayment ability, as well as future investment and borrowing. Firms 
that have higher cash flows are less likely to end an existing relationship so it is expected to 
have negative effect on the hazard of switching to other banks.  
Since in general small firms are less transparent and rely heavily on bank credit in China, 
this study uses the ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its debt as a measure of its ability to 
pledge collateral (Collateral), and the ratio of intangibles assets to total assets as a measure of 
opaqueness (Opaqueness). Therefore, we expect that firms with less capacity to pledge 
collateral and lower degree of transparency are more likely to maintain the current bank 
relationship because it might be difficult to secure a loan from an ‘outside’ lender.  
Other variables in this group are the classification indicators that relate to firm’s 
heterogeneity such as ownership structure, sector dummy and size dummy. As state-owned 
banks still dominate the banking industry in China, it is postulated that the central and local 
governments can influence the loan activities of these banks in the loan market. Generally, the 
equity of the largest state-owned enterprises are held by state or local government agencies11. 
Hence, “guanxi” lending represents an important cultural component of the bank-firm 
relationship in China (see Yin and Matthews, 2017, and Matthews and Yin, 2019). A dummy 
variable SOE is employed to identify whether firm ownership is state, coded 1 if the ultimate 
shareholders of firm include central or local government, state bureaucrats, state-owned legal 
entities, and 0 for those non-state-owned enterprises (i.e. private, foreign, or other ownership 
enterprises). A Large dummy is included to identify whether the probability of switch is higher 
for large sized firms or not. The classification of large and SMEs are based on the Statistical 
Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, which is described in Appendix A.2 Variable Descriptions12. To control for 
potential industrial effects, we aggregate the firms into eight industries according to the 
 
11 Such as State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the Ministry of Finance, 
the local Bureau of Finance, and Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
12 The financial indicators calculated as ratio based on the accounting formulas when we collect these data, then 
we converted them into percentage in the estimation analysis to maintain consistency.  
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Industry Classifying Index Code of listed companies released by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)13. 
The second group of variables relate to the characteristics of management. Faccio et al. 
(2016), find that female CEOs tend to avoid riskier investment and financing opportunities, 
also firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance 
of survival than firms run by male CEOs. Following their study, we control for the gender of 
the CEO (Gender) and identify whether it would increase the hazard of making a change 
decision. Other management characteristics include the executive’s age (CEOage) and length 
of tenure (Tenure).  
A number of China studies have confirmed that CEO turnover has negative effects on 
private firms’ performance14. A change of CEO can influence the strategic direction of a firm’s 
operation and a firm’s relationship with its existing loan provider. An indicator variable 
(Change) has been used to capture the effect of CEO change on firm’s hazard of switching loan 
provider. A change in CEO can be expected to lower the hazard of a firm switching, because 
CEO turnover brings management instability and increase firm’s uncertainty. Conversely, in 
the context of China, a new CEO brings with it established relationships forged by ‘guanxi’ in 
a previous position, thus increasing the likelihood of a change in loan provider15.  
The third group of covariates relate to the characteristics of banks. Due to the non-
availability of financial data for some lending banks, particularly for those relatively small 
banks or banks’ sub-branches in small cities or less developed area, we use the ownership of 
banks to characterize the impact of bank variables on the hazard of firm switching. The lending 
banks have been classified into six sub groups according to their ownership structure, which 
are five large state-owned commercial banks (SOB, also known as Big5), policy banks (Policy), 
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), city commercial banks (CCB), foreign banks (Foreign), 
other banks include rural commercial banks, urban or rural credit cooperatives, and financial 
institutions (Other). To emphasise the effect of bank ownership, a variable nonSOB combines 
all the types of lending banks except the five large SOBs. 
 
13 These are: agriculture (Agri), mining (Min), manufacturing (Manuf), construction (Constr),  energy (Energy), 
transportation (Transp), real estate (RE) and services (Serv). Eight sector dummies that takes value 1 when the 
firm is operating in the sector of Agriculture /Mining /Manufacturing /Construction /Energy /Transportation /Real 
estate /Service, 0 otherwise. 
14 For example, Yu and Xu (2016); and Yin (2017) 
15 Where CEO data is not available we use information on the Chairman. 
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Lastly, the fourth set of covariates relate to the macro-economic environment, which 
include monetary policy instrument and crisis dummy variables. China’s monetary policy has 
frequently changed in recent years. To guide liquidity levels, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) implement adjustments in its monetary framework to pave the way for establishing a 
short-term PBoC policy rate like that used in advanced economies. The PBoC frequently 
adjusts reserve requirements and the benchmark deposit and lending rates to stabilize economic 
fluctuations. Three instruments which including two price-based (Lending rate and Reserve) 
and an informal quantitative-based (Guidance) monetary tools have been employed to measure 
the effect of changing the stance of monetary policy on firm’s switch behaviour. Because this 
study focuses on lending and borrowing relationships, the interest rate is denoted by the RMB 
one-year benchmark lending rate rather than RMB 1-year benchmark deposit rate. The reserve 
requirement denoted by the reserve ratio for large and small financial institution. In addition, 
following Chen et al. (2017), five dummy variables have been used to proxy five stances of 
non-standard monetary policy tool window guidance, definition of each stance has been shown 
in Appendix A.2 Variable Descriptions. 
On the other side, in response to the financial crisis during 2007-2008, the central 
government launched a stimulus package of 4 trillion yuan that included policies to loosen 
control on banks so they can expand credit in late 2008. The stimulus plan was mainly targeted 
in key areas such as rural infrastructure and transportation that are dominated by SOEs that can 
be traced to state control over its banking system and corporate sector. It is found that the 
effectiveness of China’s stimulus plan stems from the contribution of the SOEs (Wen and Wu, 
2014). During the recession period, SOEs expanded their borrowing, investment and 
production capacity and generated a rapid recovery of aggregate demand with credit provided 
by the SOBs. This study includes a crisis dummy (Crisis) as well as several interactive terms 
that capture the cross effects between crisis dummy and ownerships of firms or banks, also the 
cross effects between CEO turnover and ownership of firms or banks.  
3.4 Sample selection and data source 
The data used in this study is mainly accessed from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database of Shenzhen GTA Data Technology Co., Ltd. GTA 
CSMAR is a unique, comprehensive database of China stock returns, covering all companies 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and provides the 
most accurate, reliable and useful financial data that includes the data on China stock markets, 
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bank loan, financial statements and corporate governance. We use the data of listed companies 
which include state and non-state-owned companies16. Due to the complex ownership policy, 
structure and penetration of the state, SOEs are often less isolated from the legal framework 
applicable to other companies. It is also argued that SOEs focus more on social outcomes and 
aim at non-commercial goals rather than maximization of firm value or profit. To avoid this 
bias, we use the data of A–Share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 1996-201617. An advantage of using listed firms is that they have to provide a 
high degree of transparency and disclosure of information due to the legal structure of stock 
exchanges, which ensures their financial data more reliable than that of non-listed SOEs.  
We collect data on four categories from China Listed Firms Research Series data: Bank 
loan, Financial Statements, Corporate Governance and Equity Nature. The loan data describes 
the relationship between borrower (firm) and bank is annually collected from Bank Loan 
category that includes the name of the lending bank, loan duration, borrowing amount, starting 
and ending date of loan relation. In addition, the data of firm-specific variables is collected 
from Balance Sheet Statement, Income Statement and Statement of Cash Flows from the 
Financial Statement categories. As regards the industry and ownership classification indicator, 
the data is collected from the Sector and Equity Nature categories18. Moreover, the data of 
CEO’s characteristics is collected from the Executive information from the Corporate 
Governance category19. As regards the monetary policy instruments, the 1-year benchmark 
lending rate and reserve requirement ratios can be accessed from the website of People’s Bank 
of China (PBoC), the step-by-step development of PBoC’s non-standard window guidance 
policy can be found from the quarterly China Monetary Policy Report and the indicators of five 
guidance stances can be referred from the definitions made by Chen et al. (2017). 
 
 
16 The advantage of using listed data is that they meet audit and accounting standards specified by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission and therefore meet minimum audit transparency conditions. Hence there is 
little differentiation in audit quality and does not require an independent cross-validation of the loan book as in 
Khwaja and Mian (2005). 
17 In order to be a publicly listed company, a SOE must be restructured into a stock company through the sale of 
shares to other companies, legal entities or its employees firstly. Next, the SOE sells a part of shares (usually 1/3) 
to the general public. Hence, shares of SOE have been split into two parts: non-tradable shares of state or state-
owned legal entity, and tradable shares of individual investors or private enterprises. Once firms become publicly 
listed, they have to focus on the interest of shareholders. 
18 The data may include involuntary switches due to a breach of the loan covenant. While we cannot identify these 
firms directly, any involuntary switch would be correlated with firm-specific variables in the model. We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
19 Apart from using the CSMAR database, the 20-year data of GDP deflator and exchange are collected from the 
Word Bank. 
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3.5 Descriptive statistics 
By organizing the duration data in spells, where a spell describes the number of months 
of a firm-bank relationship, it can be seen in Figure 2, that the mean duration of these bank-
firm relationships is 27.38 months, but they last longer in the group of large firms (about 28.33 
months) than in the small and medium firms (around 25.33 months, on average). In addition, 
these relationships last on average 30.97 months in the group of state-owned firms, which is 
relatively longer than non-state-owned firms that is 23.55 months. The survival analysis shows 
that 75% of these firm-bank relationships survive up to 13 months, 50% of these relationships 
survives up to 36 months, but only 25% of these relationships survive longer than 99 months. 
A benchmark model will be estimated by including all sets of covariates as well as interactive 
terms. Due to the fact that SOEs access to preferential lending while small firms are less easily 
to obtain funds relative to other firms, separate regressions for different groups will be 
considered in this study, which includes subsamples of SOEs, non-SOEs, large, and medium 
and small firms (SMEs). Furthermore, robustness test will be performed by adding the number 
of bank relationships (Number) and geographical effects, and separate regressions that without 
or with the additional variables.  
Figure 2: Mean duration among different sizes or ownership of firms 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on duration, lending, and firm-characteristic 
variables. With respect to the characteristics of executives, 95% of the sample of firms are 
running by male CEOs and the average duration of a CEO’s tenure is 3 years. Most firms retain 
multiple bank relationships during the sample period, 48.16% of the listed firms changed their 
lender after their previous borrowing. The main reason for the high incidence of multiple bank 
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relationships is that this study counts each borrowing–lending relationship as one observation, 
a firm with multiple borrowing relationships enters as two or more observations. More details 
of matched firm (loan)-bank relationship dataset, censoring issue and descriptive statistics are 
set out in Appendix A.3 Descriptive Analysis. 
Table 1: Descriptive summary 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Duration (month) 7,570 27.378 26.232 0.033 240.132 
Loan (CNY mil) 7,570 198.000 663.000 0.088 32,400.000 
Age (month) 7,570 172.158 64.366 24.592 398.466 
Size 7,570 22.125 1.079 18.542 27.006 
SOE 7,570 0.416 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Profit (%) 7,570 2.780 4.939 -48.316 49.637 
Leverage (%) 7,570 6.833 9.276 0.000 77.506 
Cash flows (%) 7,570 9.554 8.595 0.000 79.765 
Growth (%) 7,570 0.742 19.623 -0.984 1497.156 
Collateral (%) 7,570 1681.894 17785.480 76.667 1265251 
Opaqueness (%) 7,570 5.052 6.944 0.000 81.532 
CEO age(year） 7,570 48.205 6.301 28.000 71.000 
Gender 7,570 0.945 0.229 0.000 1.000 
Tenure(month) 7,570 40.801 36.818 6.000 216.000 
Change 7,570 0.126 0.332 0.000 1.000 
Big5 7,570 0.275 0.447 0.000 1.000 
JSCBs 7,570 0.419 0.493 0.000 1.000 
CCBs 7,570 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000 
Lending rate (%) 7,570 5.917 0.533 4.967 7.164 
Reserve rate (%) 7,570 17.098 2.726 6.285 19.347 
Crisis 7,570 0.110 0.313 0.000 1.000 
Number 7,570 4.806 3.944 1.000 28.000 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Survival analysis         
We now turn to the empirical results. Estimation is conducted in a series of stages. 
Without making assumptions about the functional form of survival and cumulative hazard 
function, and the effects of covariates, we obtain the plots of the Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimate and Nelson-Aalen cumulated hazard estimate (not shown) for the overall sample of 
listed firms, state and non-state groups, large, medium and small groups. From these results we 
can confirm that state-owned firms and large firms’ bank relationships have a better survival 
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experience than non-state-owned firms and medium and small-sized firms. The hazard of 
changing to new lender is correspondently higher for non-state-owned firms and SMEs. The 
term baseline generally means that these are the functions when all covariates are set to zero, a 
baseline hazard contribution is defined at every analytical time t at which a change in bank loan 
provider or switch (or failure) occurs and is undefined at other times. After obtaining the 
baseline hazard contributions, a smoothing operation is performed. Under a Cox model, all 
change (switch) times contribute to the estimate of the baseline hazard, not just those of which 
SOE=1, and the baseline hazard may in turn be converted to be the hazard for any covariate 
pattern using a proportionality assumption. Generally, the probability of SOEs changing their 
loan provider (switch) is relatively lower than non-SOEs.  
Using the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of the firm-specific 
characteristics and other covariates on the conditional probability of a switch to other lenders, 
the estimation results are reported in Table 2. Instead of reporting the hazard ratios generated 
from the survival analysis, we report the estimated coefficients because it gives the immediate 
direction of covariate effects. Exponential coefficients can be interpreted as the ratio of the 
hazards for one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. There are two ways to interpret the 
signs on the coefficient estimates represented by β in the empirical model. First, each coefficient 
estimate indicates the partial impact of a covariate on the hazard of firm changes its lender, 
holding duration constant. Second, due to the hazard rate being inversely related to the duration, 
a positive (negative) coefficient estimate implies a shorter (longer) firm-bank relationship 
duration.  
Column (1) shows the results for the benchmark model which including all sets of 
covariates. The results from the benchmark model demonstrate that only the coefficients on 
Age, Size, SOE, Leverage, Tenure, Change, SOBs, CCBs, Lending rate, Reserve and Crisis are 
statistically significant. From the signs of the estimated coefficients, we can infer that, young 
and small firms, firms with a longer CEO tenure, and also firms that experience a new CEO are 
more likely to change bank loan provider (switch). However, by controlling for the ownership 
and size of firms, the results indicate that both SOEs firms and larges firms are less likely to 
switch but tend to keep stronger and longer lasting relationships with the banks, which proves 
that the observed difference in the mean duration of firm-bank relationships between state and 
non-state firms, and also between large, medium and small firms observed in the descriptive 
statistics, is statistically significant. The coefficients of SOE show that the hazard of switching 
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loan provider is 9.79% lower if it is a state-owned firms20, this effect is stronger for subsample 
of large firms. 
 Additionally, the conditional likelihood of a change (switch) is significantly lower for 
firms with a higher level of leverage and, it seems that those less risky firms benefit from better 
loan conditions than smaller and less profitable firms, and therefore suffer less from the 
information monopoly of the banks. This could also be the result of mutual interest of these 
firms and the banks to maintain their relationships. However, the cash flows becomes 
insignificant when additional sets of regressors are added in the benchmark model (see Colum 
(3), (5) and (7) in the robustness test result Table 3 for significant coefficient).  Similarly, the 
proxies for the firm’s profitability, growth opportunity, ability of collateral, and opacity, are not 
significant although correctly signed. 
 Regarding the managerial characteristics of firms, it is seen that while there is a positive 
and significant impact of CEO’s tenure on the hazard of switching, the quantitative effect is 
very small, a 1-year increase in CEO’s tenure increase the hazard of switching by only 0.1% 
and therefore can be considered as statistically significant but economically insignificant. 
However, a CEO change implies that the firm that experiences a change in the CEO during a 
current bank relationship has an increased hazard of changing loan provider. An arriving CEO 
may bring with it the baggage of previous relationships with banks developed in their previous 
position. It is likely that firms that have a new CEO, especially those with political connections, 
are more able to use their connections to access better credit conditions, increasing the 
probability of a switch21. The insignificant coefficients of age and gender of firm’s CEO show 
no evidence that firms run by male CEOs have higher probability of changing their loan 
provider than firms run by female CEOs in China.  
 When ownership of the bank is considered, the coefficients on the SOB and CCB are 
statistically significant, with negative and positive sign, respectively. It is easy to understand 
that firms borrowing from the five large SOBs (also called Big5) are more likely to maintain 
 
20Given the Cox proportional hazard function ℎ(𝑡)  = ℎ0(𝑡)exp(𝛃
′𝐱), then hazard ratio 
ℎ(𝑡|x)
ℎ0(𝑡)
= exp(𝛽 SOE).             
For example, if the exponential coefficients generates the hazard ratio <1 means that 1 unit change of a particular 
covariate would lower the hazard of switching by (1-hazard ratio)*100 percent, while if the hazard ratio >1 means 
the covariate would increase the hazard of switching by (hazard ratio-1)*100 percent. The signs of the estimated 
coefficients directly indicate a positive or negative effect of particular covariate on the hazard of switching loan 
provider. 
21 The political connection route is well documented in the literature (Khwaja and Mian 2005, Charumilind et al. 
2006; Claessens et al. 2008; Yu and Pan 2008; Houston et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2018). However, the CEO’s 
political connection link has not been explicitly modelled in this paper and left for future investigation. 
 
 
21 
 
long and stable relationships. The hazard of changing loan provider for borrowers of SOBs is 
32.83% lower than those firms that do not borrow from SOBs, and this effect is stronger for 
the subsample of non-SOEs. The implication is that having bank relationships with the five 
large SOBs make these non-SOEs less likely to change their credit. However, firms that borrow 
from city commercial banks (CCBs) have a hazard of switching 16.88% higher than firms that 
do not borrow from CCBs. The reason for a switch not only depends on firms, but also on 
banks. From the bank’s perspective, CCBs may not be willing to continue with the loan-
relationship. This may be due to several possibilities. A firm’s performance may have 
deteriorated during the lending relationship period, which may give a negative signal to the 
incumbent bank, resulting in an unsuccessful loan renewal. Alternatively, the bank may react 
strategically and build up stable relationships with particular types of firms or particular sectors.  
 Turning to the external effect of the economic environment, the results show that 
changes in PBoC’s benchmark lending rate and reserve ratio have a significant impact on the 
hazard of changing a loan provider. The higher the lending rate or reserve ratio, the higher the 
likelihood of firm’s changing their loan provider, in particular this macro impacts are more 
significant for non-SOEs’ switch behaviour. Moreover, the influence of changing lending rate 
on firms switch probability is greater than changing the reserve requirements, which is 8.33% 
and 1.61% respectively. Nevertheless, the results from survival analysis shows that there is no 
significant impact of informal window guidance on firm’s switch behaviour or duration of firm-
bank relationship. Moreover, we note we find that the crisis dummy variable has a negatively 
significant effect on a firm’s probability to switch for all types of firms (see Colum (1)-(6)). 
Not surprisingly firms are less likely to switch during the financial crisis period between 2007 
and 2009. One surprising finding is that the interaction terms shows that if there is CEO 
turnover and firm’s lending banks are large SOBs, the likelihood of switching tends to be 
higher, and this effect is particularly significant in state-owned firms group. This higher switch 
probability could possibly be the case of a SOE-SOBs relationship changing to another large 
SOB through the political connection or cultural “guanxi” route. 
 Column (2) shows the variable ‘nonSOB’ to control for ownership which covers policy 
banks (PB), joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), city commercial banks (CCB), foreign 
banks (FB) and other types of lending banks (Other)22. A positive and significant coefficient of 
nonSOB confirms that if a firm’s existing lending bank is a non-SOB, they are more likely to 
 
22 We combine all types of lending banks as non-SOBs except for the five large SOBs (or Big5). 
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change loan provider banks. In addition, Columns (3) to (6) present the results for the groups 
of SOEs, non-SOEs, ‘large’, ‘medium and SMEs’, respectively. Some differences are observed. 
It can be seen that the age of the firm is only significant in the subsample of large firms. In 
other words, older large firms are less likely to switch compared to medium and small firms. 
This lower hazard of changing provider (switching) is not found in state or non-state groups, 
because the age of firms does not significant in terms of ownership, but it does matters in terms 
of size. Consistent with the benchmark result, the higher a firms’ leverage and previous 
borrowing from the SOBs, the lower the hazard of changing loan provider for the four groups 
of enterprise, and they were all less likely to switch during the crisis period.  
 While changing in CEO and borrowing from CCBs increases the likelihood of a change 
in loan provider (switch) for these groups, this effect is not significant for SMEs. In addition, 
the coefficient on the SOE dummy shows that state ownership lowers the hazard of large firms 
switching, but no similar effect is found in SMEs. These implies that the switch behaviour of 
SMEs are not determined by their ownership structure, whether they have a CEO change or 
relationships with non-SOBs. Interestingly, the coefficient on the Opaqueness (or degree of 
transparency) variable is statistically positive and significant in the non-SOEs and SMEs 
groups, implying that the opacity associated with non-SOEs or SMEs, increases the hazard of 
switching23, which contradicts the expectation that less transparent firms are more likely to stay 
with their incumbent relationship because it might be difficult for them to access loan from 
‘outside’ bank24.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 This could be a bank ‘push’ effect than a firm ‘switch’ effect in that the bank may encourage the firm to look 
elsewhere for the renewal of a loan. 
24 This variation could be possibly due to our sample are from publicly listed companies. 
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Table 2: Estimated results of Cox proportional hazard model (coefficients) 
Variable (1) 
Benchmark 
(2) 
nonSOBs 
(3) 
SOEs 
(4) 
non-SOEs 
(5) 
Large 
(6) 
SMEs 
Firm       
Age -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
Size -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.067** -0.074***   
SOE -0.103*** -0.105***   -0.126** -0.100 
Profit 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.008** 0.003 0.004 
Leverage -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.006** 
Cash flows -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
Growth -0.000 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
Collateral -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Opaqueness 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005** -0.001 0.004*** 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management       
CEOage 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 
Gender -0.036 -0.040 -0.044 -0.022 -0.067 -0.053 
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.000 
Change 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.174** 0.265*** 0.337*** 0.041 
Bank       
SOB -0.398***  -0.361*** -0.439*** -0.398*** -0.320*** 
JSCB 0.026  0.103 -0.039 0.018 0.125 
CCB 0.156***  0.157** 0.147** 0.201** 0.155 
nonSOB  0.460***     
Environment       
Lending rate 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.051 0.115*** 0.091*** 0.112** 
Reserve 0.016** 0.016** 0.012 0.017 0.015 0.004 
Guidance 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.005 0.023 
Crisis -0.396*** -0.394*** -0.324*** -0.465*** -0.379*** -0.365** 
Change*SOB 0.243***  0.214** 0.094 0.148 0.111 
Obs. 7,570 7,570 3,140 4,430 5,150 2,420 
Mean duration 27.38 27.38 30.97 23.55 28.33 25.33 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Column (1) presents the 
results of the benchmark model using semiparametric Cox model; Column (2) re-estimate the benchmark model 
while uses a new variable ‘nonSOB’ to denote the ownership of lending banks which includes all types of banks 
except the five large SOBs (Big5); Columns (3) and (4) present separate results for the group of ‘state-owned’ 
firms and ‘non-state owned’ firms, respectively; Columns (5) and (6) shows separate results for the group of 
‘large’ firms and ‘SMEs’ firms. The results of adding different sets of regressors have been displayed in Table 
3. 
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4.2 Robustness test 
To check the robustness of the estimated results in Table 3, we control for regional 
effects and the number of bank relationship and use the Cox proportional hazard model to 
analyse the effects of these covariates. We allow for the possibility that economic development 
policy, and financial environment varies across cities and provinces in China by controlling for 
a locational effect on firm-bank relationship and firms switching behaviour. According to the 
geographical location of firms, this study uses four city dummies to examine whether firms 
located in the most developed first-tier cities in China are more likely to switch lenders, as they 
are assumed to be granted loans more easily in these areas.  
As Elsas (2005) suggests, exclusivity gives rise to a lower degree of direct competition 
between banks, which allows for unique access to valuable information and eases the 
realization of the economic benefits associated with relationship lending, for example, efficient 
renegotiation of loan contract. It is argued that there is a negative correlation between the 
number of banks in a multiple bank relationship and the incidence of relationship lending or 
repeated lending. Hence, a variable Number has been employed to measure the number of bank 
relationship to examine its effect on Chinese firms’ switch behaviour.  
 The results of robustness test are shown in Table 325. Column (1) replicates the results 
of benchmark model from Table 3-Column (1). Column (2) shows the results of robustness 
check by adding the variable ‘Number’ and four city dummies, they are ‘Beijing’, ‘Shanghai’, 
‘Guangzhou’ and ‘Shenzhen’.  Columns (3) to (8) show the estimated coefficients for adding 
additional set of covariates. As can be seen from this table, our main results are maintained. 
Firms that have multiple bank relationships are more likely to switch, the more relationship 
they have, the higher the likelihood of switching. It is not hard to understand because more 
bank relationships imply a firm is less loyal to its main bank, thus the likelihood to have 
multiple bank relationships or switch lender is higher.  In addition, firms located in Shanghai 
has lower hazard of switching, this could be interpreted as firms located in the financial centre 
of China enjoy more stable bank relationships and they are less likely to suffer financial 
difficulty because their credit needs can always be fulfilled by their current credit provider. 
Shanghai has a relatively complete and mature financial market system, firms enjoy higher 
 
25 In addition to the semiparametric analysis, we also estimated the hazard function by parametric methods. The 
results using both Weibull and Exponential specification are almost in line with the results from using 
semiparametric analysis - Cox proportional hazard model. The results are available on request.  
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liquidity and better financial condition and support from financial institutions in the financial 
centre of China. Although the signs of other three regional dummies are positive these effects 
are insignificant. Overall, the results of adding and dropping different regressors are almost in 
line with the results from benchmark model for some covariates, but some of the coefficients 
vary slightly. For example, adding additional regressors increases the effect of firm size and 
CEO change, while reduces the effect of state ownership and leverage. Nevertheless, using 
these four city dummies indicates the limitation of this robustness test because the number of 
firms from these four first-tier cities only accounts for one third of the sample. Hence, the 
regional effects are tenuous.  
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Table 3: Estimated results of Cox proportional hazard model (coefficients) 
Variable (1) 
Benchmark 
(2)  
(3)  
(4)  
(5)  
(6 )  
(7)  
(8)  
Firm 
     
Age -0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Size -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.077*** 
SOE -0.103*** -0.097** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.146*** -0.139*** -0.122*** -0.115*** 
Profit 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Leverage -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Cash flows -0.003 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Collateral -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Opaqueness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Industry26 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management         
CEOage 0.000 0.000   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Gender -0.036 -0.060 
  
0.015 -0.011 -0.013 -0.036 
Tenure 0.001** 0.001* 
  
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Change 0.225*** 0.200*** 
  
0.218*** 0.240*** 0.232*** 0.245*** 
Bank         
SOB -0.398*** -0.399*** 
    
-0.431*** -0.433*** 
JSCB 0.026 0.016 
    
0.005 -0.006 
CCB 0.156*** 0.141*** 
    
0.142*** 0.126** 
Environment         
Lending rate 0.080** 0.085** 
      
Reserve 0.016* 0.015* 
      
Guidance 0.010        
Crisis -0.396*** -0.397*** 
      
Change*SOB 0.243***        
Other         
Number  0.023***  0.027***  0.025***  0.025*** 
Beijing  0.091  0.101*  0.144**  0.075 
Shanghai  -0.305***  -0.195**  -0.313***  -0.300*** 
Guangzhou  0.112  0.165  0.170  0.147 
Shenzhen 
 
0.029 
 
0.014 
 
0.023 
 
0.004 
Obs. 7,570 7,570 9,753 9,753 7,570 7,570 7,570 7,570 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Column (1) replicates the results of 
benchmark model from Table 2; Column (2) shows the results of robustness check by adding the number of bank 
relationships and regional dummies (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen); Columns (3) to (8) present the results 
of adding different sets of variables (firms’ characteristics, managerial characteristics, bank characteristics, crisis dummy 
and interaction terms) additionally. More specifically, Columns (3), (5) and (7) presents the results prior to the robustness 
test, while Columns (4), (6) and (8) are performed to check the robustness by including the number of bank relationship and 
locational dummies. 
 
 
26 We do not report the coefficients of eight sector dummies to save space, the full estimation results are available 
on request. 
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5. Conclusion 
What causes firms to change to different loan provider in China? Using 7,570 effective firm-
bank loan relationships matched data during 1996-2016, this paper has used survival analysis 
to investigate the causes of the changes to firm-bank relationship and the hazard of a firm 
changing its bank loan provider which we define as a ‘switch’. A switch is defined as a firm 
borrows from a bank that it did not have a loan relationship in the prior 12 months. The 
estimated results provide evidence that the main drivers of firms’ switching behaviour are a 
mixture of their credit needs, the attributes of firms and bank ownership-type, as well as the 
macro-economic environmental factor. 
 Controlling for time-varying and time-invariant covariates of firm’s characteristics, 
management characteristics, bank type-ownership and the economic environment, this study 
finds small and young firms, less leveraged firms and firms with multiple bank relationships 
are more likely to switch to other banks, which shares some common findings with Ongena and 
Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002), Gopalan, Udell and Yerramilli (2011), and 
Bouchellal and Castro (2016).  Controlling for industry, firms operating in the real estate sector 
have a relatively higher hazard of switch banks, compared to other sectors. In addition, this 
study shows that the characteristic of executives has significant positive effects on the hazard 
of firms switching. The hazard of firms switching will be higher if they experience a change to 
the CEO during the relationship period, and their tenure will increase the likelihood of changing 
banks. Although changing CEO may increase the tendency to switch for four groups of 
enterprises, the impact of changing CEO on the hazard of switching is greater for non-SOEs 
and large groups enterprises, compared to SOEs or SMEs.  
 Firms that borrow from non-SOBs have a higher hazard of changing their bank loan 
provider (switching), while firms that have a loan relationship with the five large-scaled state 
commercial banks (SOBs) are more likely to stay longer in a stable bank relationship and less 
likely to change loan providers. Increasing the PBoC’s benchmark lending rate and reserve 
requirement ratio during the tight monetary policy period may push firms to switch, this may 
be due to an increase in bargaining power from the lending side. Likewise, all firms are less 
likely to switch in times of economic crisis as in the 2008-2009 period. SOBs and SOEs have 
super stable firm-bank relationships, as for the rest; small, young and non-SOEs, firms with 
lower leverage, and multiple bank relationships, and operating in the real estate sector are more 
likely to switch. Firms that borrow from non-SOBs are also more likely to switch. Significantly, 
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a long CEO tenure and a CEO switch during the lending relationship increases the likelihood 
of a switch.  
 What do these results tell us about the Chinese banking system and the lending 
relationship with the company sector? It tells us that even in an environment of increasing 
commercialisation, an environment fostered by the continuous reforms to the banking sector, 
the firm-bank relationship between SOEs and SOBs remain strong, but the credit needs of the 
firm puts a strain on it. A change in the CEO increases the likelihood of a firm changing its 
loan provider but a change to whom? It is possible that in the case of the SOE-SOB relationship 
the change is to another SOB through the political connection route. While we do not have 
direct evidence of ‘guanxi’ type behaviour, we argue that our results can be interpreted as 
indirect evidence of its existence. In that sense, another interpretation is that the increased 
commercialisation of relationships in recent times has pushed firms away from the traditional 
‘guanxi’ type of relationship in business, but these relationships particularly in the state-sector 
remain strong. Nearly half of firms maintain a multiple bank relationship and changing their 
loan provider does not cut them off from resurrecting a past bank relationship in the future. 
This paper addresses the drivers of the hazard of change in loan provider but the change to 
which bank, can be revealed in an analysis of a general matrix of behaviour typified by ‘brand 
switching’. A cursory analysis suggests that SOEs tend to switch internally between SOBs (or 
Big5) only indicating the strength of relationship within state-owned businesses. But this is a 
subject of future research.
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Appendix A 
A.1 Commercialisation 
China’s banking industry has undergone major transformational changes such as specialization, 
commercialization, and marketization since 1978. Specifically, state-owned banks have been 
commercialized and restructured into a more market-based footing since the early 1990s. 
Shareholding banks have been established and recognized since 1996, and markets have been 
gradually opened up to foreign-owned banks, and to Chinese-foreign joint-venture financial 
institutions since the early 2000s.  
The banking system has at its core the Peoples’ Bank of China (the central bank), with five 
large state-owned commercial banks as the mainstay, with competition among various types of 
banking financial institutions that include joint-stock commercial banks, city commercials 
banks, rural banks and other financial institutions. Compared with the pre-reform banking 
system that was dominated by the central bank and four specialized commercial banks, the 
market share of major types of banks change significantly, which can be seen from Figure 1A. 
In addition, Figure 2A indicates that the private sector’s ability to access bank loans 
significantly increased starting in 2010, or even earlier. The new system of development has 
moved forward in the new period of development in a relatively more competitive and 
commercialised environment. 
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Figure 1A: Markets shares of major groups of banks 
 
Note: SOB indicates five largest State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB indicates Joint-stock 
commercial banks; CCB indicates City commercial banks; RCB indicates Rural commercial banks; PB 
indicates Policy banks; FB indicates foreign banks. 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report (2017).  
 
Figure2A: Flow of enterprise loans by ownership, 2010-12 
(% of total enterprise loan) 
 
Sources: China Banking Association (2011, 2012, 2013). 
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Table 1A: Description of the variables, and expected signs 
Variables Description Unit Sign 
Duration Duration of a firm-bank relationship lasts. Month  
Age Age of the firm when the firm switches. Month +/- 
Size Natural logarithm of year-ended total asset deflated by 
the Chinese GDP deflator. 
CNY + 
SOE Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is 
state-owned enterprise, 0 otherwise. 
- - 
Profit Return on assets. % + 
Leverage Percentage of long-term debt to total assets.  % - 
Cash flows Percentage of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. % - 
Growth Percentage of sales growth. % - 
Collateral Percentage of tangible assets to total debt. % + 
Opaqueness Percentage of intangible assets to total assets. % - 
Industry  Eight sector dummies that takes value 1 when the firm is 
operating in the sector of Agriculture /Mining 
/Manufacturing /Construction /Transportation /Energy 
/Real estate /Service, 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
CEOage Age of CEO when the firm switches. Year +/- 
Gender Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is run 
by a male CEO, 0 otherwise. 
- + 
Tenure Tenure of CEO when the firm switches. Month - 
Change Dummy variable takes value 1 if there is a change in 
CEO in a current relationship, 0 otherwise. 
 - 
SOB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
the five largest state-owned commercial banks (also 
known as Big5), 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
JSCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
joint-stock commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
CCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
city commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
nonSOB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
not the largest state commercial banks (Big5). 
- + 
Lending rate PBoC’s one-year benchmark lending rate.  % + 
Reserve PBoC’s reserve requirement ratio. % + 
Guidance  Five dummy variables represent five stances of window 
guidance policy that take value -2 for strongly 
discouraging period, -1 for weakly discouraging period, 
0 for no explicit direction, 1 for weakly encouraging 
period and 2 for strongly encouraging period.   
% + 
Crisis Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of 
switching in crisis year 2008 and 2009, 0 otherwise. 
- - 
Change*Firm(
or Bank) 
Cross effect of CEO change dummy and different types 
of firm or bank. 
- +/- 
Crisis*Firm(or 
Bank  
Cross effect of crisis dummy and different types of firm 
or bank 
- +/- 
 
Table 2A: Statistical definitions of large, small and medium sized firms 
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Industry category Index Unit Large Medium-sized Small 
Farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry 
and fishing 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥20000 500≤Y＜20000 50≤Y＜500 
Industry 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 20≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥40000 2000≤Y＜40000 300≤Y＜2000 
Construction 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥80000 6000≤Y＜80000 300≤Y＜6000 
Total assets(Z) 10,000 Z≥80000 5000≤Z＜80000 300≤Z＜5000 
Wholesale 
Employees(X) People X≥200 20≤X＜200 5≤X＜20 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥40000 5000≤Y＜40000 1000≤Y＜5000 
Retail 
Employees(X) People X≥300 50≤X＜300 10≤X＜50 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥20000 500≤Y＜20000 100≤Y＜500 
Transport 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 20≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥30000 3000≤Y＜30000 200≤Y＜3000 
Storage 
Employees(X) People X≥200 100≤X＜200 20≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥30000 1000≤Y＜30000 100≤Y＜1000 
Post 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 20≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥30000 2000≤Y＜30000 100≤Y＜2000 
Hotels 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥10000 2000≤Y＜10000 100≤Y＜2000 
Catering service 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥10000 2000≤Y＜10000 100≤Y＜2000 
Information 
transmission 
Employees(X) People X≥2000 100≤X＜2000 10≤X＜100 
Operating  
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥100000 1000≤Y＜100000 100≤Y＜1000 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
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Software and 
information 
technology services 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥10000 1000≤Y＜10000 50≤Y＜1000 
Real estate 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥200000 1000≤Y＜200000 100≤Y＜1000 
Total assets(Z) 10,000 Z≥10000 5000≤Z＜10000 2000≤Z＜5000 
Property management 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 100≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥5000 1000≤Y＜5000 500≤Y＜1000 
Leasing and business 
services 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Total assets(Z) 10,000 Z≥120000 8000≤Z＜120000 100≤Z＜8000 
Unspecified industry Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011) 
 
Table 3A: Window guidance policy stance 
 
Source: Quarterly China Monetary Policy Report, and Chen et al. (2017). 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Stance Period Definition 
-2 Strongly discouraging 2003Q1-2004Q4 
2006Q2-2008Q2 
2009Q2-2010Q1 
CMPR explicitly discourage 
growth of total credit. 
-1 Weakly discouraging 2005Q1-2006Q1 
2010Q1-2012Q2 
CMPR points the target of 
optimizing credit structure, 
provides risk warning, and/or 
mentions that banks should 
control the pace of credit growth. 
0 No explicit direction 2001Q1-2002Q4 
2012Q3-2014Q2 
CMPR only mentions the target 
of optimizing credit structure and 
separately listing the sectors that 
should be both discouraging and 
encouraging or no explicit 
direction of credit growth. 
1 Weakly encouraging 2014Q3-Present CMPR only lists sectors that to be 
encouraged for the target of 
optimizing credit structure. 
2 Strongly encouraging 1998Q1-2000Q4 
2008Q3-2009Q1 
CMPR explicitly encourages the 
growth of total credit. 
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A.3 Descriptive Analysis 
Finally, there is 18,233 matched firm-bank relationships includes 2,102 listed companies in our 
sample, 69% of these loan relationships with large firms, 31% with small and medium firms, 
and 44% with state-owned firms while 56% with non-state-owned firms. This complete 
matched dataset includes 1,326 large firms and 776 medium and small sized firms, more than 
half of the sample listed firms come from private sector or controlled by foreign firms. The 
distribution of loans among different groups and summary of sample listed firms by ownership 
and size have been shown in Figure 3A and Figure 4A, respectively.   
Figure 3A: Distribution of loans among different groups 
   
Figure 4A: Number of firms 
 
In addition, more than half of the sample listed firms running in manufacturing sector that 
accounts for 59% of these firm-bank relationships. The second and third largest groups of 
sectors are the service and real estate sector, which account for 16% and 7% of these 
relationships, respectively. Despite the largest three groups of sectors, the number of firms that 
running in other sectors such as mining, energy, transport, construction and agriculture have 
44%
50%
5% 1%
State Private Foreign Other
31%
69%
SMEs Large firms
474
684
302
642
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
SMEs Large
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
fi
rm
s
Non-state State-owned
 
 
38 
 
been summarized in Figure 5A. Moreover, lending banks measured by ownership has been 
displayed in Figure 6A, borrowing from the five large state-owned commercial banks (SOB or 
Big5) or joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB) account for one third of these borrowing -
lending relationships, the third largest type of lending bank is city commercial banks (CCB) 
with 16.94% lending relationships. Due to the borrowing relationships with foreign banks, 
policy banks and other financial institutions account for quite small proportions, we only 
include the largest three types of Chinese banks in the benchmark model of survival analysis. 
Figure 5A: Number of firms in different sectors 
 
Note: Agri denotes Agriculture sector; Min indicates Mining sector; Manuf denotes Manufacturing 
sector; Constr denotes Construction sector; Energy denotes Energy sector; Transp denotes 
Transportation sector; RE denotes Real Estate sector; Serv denotes Service sector. 
 
Figure 6A: Number of lending banks 
 
Note: SOB denotes five large State-owned Commercial Banks (also known as the “Big5); JSCB denotes 
Joint-stock Commercial Banks; CCB denotes City Commercial Banks, PB denotes Policy Banks; FB 
denotes Foreign Banks; OB denotes other banks includes Rural Commercial Banks, Rural Cooperative 
Banks, Rural Credit Cooperatives, and other financial institutions. 
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Appendix B 
 
B.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 1B: Conceptual Framework 
 
Note: There are two sides of the loan market which including the demand side by firm and supply side 
by bank. For the demand side, this study considers the firm’s attributes such as ownership, size, industry, 
performance measures indicators (such as profitability, liquidity and leverage) and management 
characteristics, which includes executives’ age, gender, tenure, and whether there is a CEO change in a 
firm-bank relationship. On the other side, due to the limit availability of the financial data for some 
small banks or bank’s sub-branch in less developed regions, for the supply side, this study only considers 
the ownership structure of banks. Moreover, this study considers the environmental factors such as 
monetary policy condition and financial crisis period, as well as the regional effects in the robustness 
test. 
 
B.2 Matched firm-loan-bank data 
To perform a survival analysis, the data must be converted into duration format that includes 
the start and end date of a relationship duration. Using MATLAB program, we deal with the 
raw data and match the loan data (borrowing-lending records) with the corresponding firm’s 
specific characteristics. The loan data shows that the bank loans could be obtained either from 
a single or multiple lenders. In addition, this loan data consists the information of the stock 
code of sample listed firms, name of lending banks, lending deals, and starting and ending date 
of loan relation. However, the information on this time span of lending relationship is not 
complete, as well as other deal indicators. For example, some of the observations have one 
missing loan indicator, but some of the observations have two or more missing loan indicators. 
Besides, some observations have missing starting or ending date of loan relationship or even 
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both of this duration information. From these loan data, the announcement date (date of loan 
announcement listed company released on the publication specified by the stock exchange) is 
about two to ten days prior to the start date of loan borrowing. For those observations with non-
available ending date of loan, these could be calculated by using the starting date plus the loan 
period. Secondly, the data for firm’s specific characteristics and other variables such as deflator 
and exchange rates collected from the CSMAR database and World-Bank across the sample 
period from 1996 to 2016 has been matched to the loan data though MATLAB program. 
Concatenating the firm’s identity (stock code) and the starting year of loan borrowing, the 
corresponding firm’s characteristics, management characteristics, and environment factors in a 
specific year for a specific sample listed firm have been matched to firm’s loan data at the start 
of loan relationship. One thing should be pointed out here is that the firm’s switching behaviour 
cannot be identified without the information of lending bank, therefore this study excludes 
those observations that without information of lending banks, firms operated in financial sector 
are excluded as well.  As a firm-loan-bank relationship has been counted as one observation, a 
firm with multiple bank relationships enters as two or more observations. After combining 
those repeated borrowings from their incumbent banks within 12 months to the previous firm-
bank relationship durations, and cleaning out observations that provided only partial 
information, the overall sample size reduces. Finally, there is a panel matched dataset with 
7,570 firm-bank relationships which including 2,102 Chinese listed firms. 
 
B.3 Censoring  
The termination of firm-bank relationship or firm’s switch behaviour may have not yet occurred 
by the end of the observation period, or the relationship duration may also have lasted for a 
while before entering the observation. In these cases, there are incomplete observations over 
time. Censoring is defined as when the failure (switch in this case) occurs and the subject is not 
under observation, which is a partial ignorance about the duration and can be categorized into 
three types: 
(i) Right Censoring: the subject participates in the study for a time, but it is not under 
observation when failure occurs. 
(ii) Left Censoring: the failure occurs at some time before the subject entering the 
observation. 
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(iii) Interval Censoring: rather than observing the exact time of failure, all one know is 
that failure occurs between two known time points – perhaps a short or long interval.  
 
Not knowing when a firm-bank (or loan) relationship starts, or when it ends, or both, implies 
that we are unable to observe the true duration of the relationship for these observations. There 
is not necessary to adjust left censoring in our data because all these relationships start in or 
after 1996. However, without the adjustment of right censoring, the estimation of the 
proportional hazard models produces biased and inconsistent estimates of model parameters. 
Some relationships do not end within the sample period, or some firms’ switch behaviour of 
changing loan provider do not occur by the end of our observation period, thus we adjust right 
censoring when we generate the duration of these firm and bank relationships. As Jenkins (2004) 
has provided a detailed statistical presentation for dealing with censoring in an intuitive graph 
below, the solid line is the relationship duration under observation, with a start (circle) and an 
end (cross), while the dashed part means censoring. 
Figure 2B: Censoring  
 
               under observation 
                                                                                                                        time line 
                  normal 
                       -------------                                 |-----------|                                ------- 
                     left censored                       interval censored                              right censored 
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Appendix C  
 
Table 1C: Additional Robustness Tests 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Column (1) replicates the 
results of benchmark model from Column (1) in Table 2; Columns (2)-(4) reports the results of additional 
robustness tests. Specifically, the model in Column (2) re-define the Type 2 switching that repeatedly borrow 
from same bank after a period that longer than 12 months gap as a non-switching behaviour (coded ‘switch=0’ 
for these observation) and re-estimate the benchmark model; Colum (3) excludes Type 2 switching and re-
estimate the benchmark model; Column (4) represents the result of Heckman Selection Two-steps Model. 
 
27 ‘imr’ indicates inverse mills ratio, which is an important parameter generated from the first stage of Heckman 
Selection Model. Some observations of some regressors are not available, which may result from the better 
observability of bigger companies. As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, we perform a selection bias test by 
using the two-steps Heckman Selection Model to check whether a selection bias problem presents in our model. 
However, the insignificant coefficient of the imr can confirm that there is no significant selection bias in our model, 
the data are therefore regarded as randomly selected by the model.  
Variable (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Firm 
 
 
  
Age -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
Size -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.059** -0.080*** 
SOE -0.103*** -0.097*** -0.145** -0.114*** 
Profit 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.002 
Leverage -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
Cash flows -0.003 -0.001 0.004** -0.002 
Growth 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Collateral 0.000 0.0000 0.000* 0.000 
Opaqueness 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management 
 
 
  
CEOage 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
Gender -0.036 -0.018 -0.087 -0.001 
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
Change 0.225*** 0.197*** 0.154*** 0.251*** 
Bank 
 
 
  
SOB -0.398*** -0.366*** -0.247*** -0.373* 
JSCB 0.026 0.003 0.138** 0.283 
CCB 0.156*** 0.131*** 0.195*** 0.075 
Environment 
 
 
  
Lending rate 0.080*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 
Reserve 0.016** 0.014** 0.027*** 0.009 
Guidance 0.010 0.009 0.023 0.004 
Crisis -0.396*** -0.382*** -0.338*** -0.379*** 
imr27 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
-9.166 
(0.586) 
Obs. 7,570 7,570 5,620 7,570 
